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a view of the common law would be void as repugnant to the
constitution.4 8 The West Virginia court has also stated that they are
"unmistakably enjoined to leave drastic changes in the common law
to the legislative branch of the State government." 4' 9 The questions
of whether the adoption of comparative negligence by the court
would be a drastic change, or whether such action violates the
principle of separation of powers, would themselves be questions
for the West Virginia court to resolve.
Martin Joseph Glasser

Torts-Licensed Driver's Assumption of Risk While Instructing
an Unlicensed Operator
P was giving D, a novice driver, driving instructions when the
car ran off the road and P was injured. P sued D for her injuries
and the trial court entered a judgment non obstante verdicto in favor
of D, and P appealed. Held, reversed. One who accompanies a
driver who possesses only a learner's permit for the purpose of giving
driving instructions does not assume the risk of injury as a matter of
law. Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70 (Md. 1967).
The dissenting judge felt that there was no valid factual question
as to the cause of the accident and that the accident was the result
of the defendant's inexperience which was the very factor of which
the plaintiff, as a matter of law, had assumed the risk.' The majority
conceded that when the undisputed facts allow it, a plaintiff may be
said to have assumed the risk as a matter of law. The court felt,
however, that in this case and the great majority of cases there are
several factual determinations which must be made by the jury
before the law can be applied to the particular case.2 The jury might
have to determine any one or more of these factual questions:
whether the plaintiff was accompanying the defendant to satisfy
a statutory provision or to give active instructions; whether the
driver, based on his experience doing the act that caused the accident,
could still properly be held negligent in spite of his inexperience;
whether the plaintiff, based on the facts, could have reasonably
art. VIII, § 21.
Cunningham v. County Court of Wood County, 148 W. Va. 303, 308,
134 S. E.2d 725, 728 (1964).
' Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 76 (Md. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
2 Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 73 (Md. 1967).
48 W. VA. CONST.
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anticipated the degree of inexperience of the defendant; and whether
the plaintiff may be said to have assumed the particular risk
involved.'
The term assumption of risk is said to be based upon the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria-he who consents cannot be harmed.' The
courts, although they explain and define assumption of risk in
differing manners, generally accept certain basic elements as necessary for the application of the doctrine. These necessary elements
include knowledge and appreciation of the risk involved accompanied
by a voluntary consent to encounter this known risk. The plaintiff
must fully realize, appreciate and have full knowledge of the risk
he is incurring.' If the risk involved is one that is obvious, knowledge
of the risk by the plaintiff is presumed.' An objective standard is
used to determine if the plaintiff has knowledge and appreciation of
the risk.' The plaintiff must encounter the known risk or obvious
danger voluntarily by expressed or implied consent' and this consent
may be implied by the conduct of the parties.' The plaintiff must,
however, always have a reasonable election to expose himself to the
risk or not." With regard to an occupant in a motor vehicle there
are said to be three elements to the doctrine: "(1) a hazard or
danger inconsistent with the safety of the occupant; (2) knowledge
or appreciation of the hazard by the occupant; (3) acquiescence
or a willingness to proceed in the face of the danger."" The assumption of risk by the plaintiff results in the plaintiff relieving the
defendant of an obligation of conduct related to the risk, or plaintiff's advance abandonment of any right to complain of any harm
that resulted from incurring the risk.' 2
The feeling that assumption of risk is a jury question is widespread. It has been held in fact situations analogous to Chalmers
3
4

Id. at 74.

Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1959).
5 Id. at 401; Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 73 (Md. 1967).
6 Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 75 (Md. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
7 Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 73 (Md. 1967).
8

1d.

9Id.

Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1959).
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 486(g) (1949). For additional discussion and definition of assumption of risk see the following: W. PnossEn,
10

"

HANDBOOK OF

=HE LAW OF TORTS

§ 67 (3d ed. 1964); 5A AM. Jun.

Assumption of Risk § 787 (1936); 38 AM. Jur. Negligences § 171-173 (1941);
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1155 (1955); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 174 (1966).
(dissenting opinion).
12 Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 75 (Md. 1967)
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that assumption of risk is a jury question because of the possibility
that lack of experience was not the sole cause of the accident,13 or
because there was conflicting evidence on whether the licensed
driver really assisted the permittee in learning to drive, or because
the instructor had no knowledge of the permittee's inexperience. 14
When the inexperienced driver has had some driving experience, it
has been held that the instructor may rely on the driver to make
intelligent use of that experience. Whether a resulting accident
is caused by negligent use of this experience or is caused totally by
inexperience is a jury question." The operator's possession of only
a learner's permit has been held to be evidence of his incompetency
as should be realized by the licensed driver but not such conclusive
evidence as to decide the question as a matter of law.16 A unique
case holds that while the licensed instructor as a matter of law
assumes the risk of an accident which is solely the result of the
driver's lack of skill and experience, it cannot be so held as a
matter of law where there is no evidence which positively proves
this was the cause of the accident. In this instance the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor can be invoked by the instructor which makes it
a jury question whether the accident was caused by a risk the
instructor assumed or by an unknown element which is considered
to be the driver's negligence not related to his inexperience."7
Assumption of risk does not, as a matter of law, bar recovery for
damages suffered as a result of meeting both a known risk and an
unknown risk.1" Whether the licensed driver assumed the risk of
the novice driver's negligence is a fact question and cannot be
decided as a matter of law.19 The instructor does not, as a matter
of law, assume the risk of the permittee's negligence because if that
were so, no one would ride with or attempt to teach such permittee
to drive."0 These cases suggest that there are several issues which
must be decided before the court can rule as a matter of law that
Bums v. Wheeler, 233 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (1962).
Turner v. Johnson, 333 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Ky. 1960).
Is Constantin v. Bankers Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 129 So. 2d 269, 272
(La. Ct. App. 1961); Holland v. Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. 554, 558, 13 N.E.2d
390, 392
16 (1938).
Joyce v. Quinn, 204 Pa. Super. 580, 588, 205 A.2d 611, 615 (1964).
17 Corbett v. Curtis, 225 A.2d 402, 408-409 (Me. 1967).
18 Vidal v. Town of Errol, 86 N.H. 1, 7, 162 A. 232, 236 (1932).
19 Sand v. Mahnan, 56 Cal. Rptr. 691, 698 (1967); Roberts v. Craig,
124 Cal. App. 2d 202,212, 268 P.2d 500, 507 (1954).
20 Jennings v. Hodges, 80 S.D. 582, 591, 129 N.W.2d 59, 64 (1964).
13

14
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the instructor has assumed the risk of the hazards of instructing an
inexperienced driver. 2
Not all courts adhere to this view, however. Again in cases
analogous to Chalmers, it has been held that the licensed, experienced
driver assumes, as a matter of law, the risk of an accident caused
by the novice driver's inexperience when the licensed driver knows
of that inexperience."2 The accident is said to be caused not by the
novice driver's negligence but by his inexperience which is exactly
the risk that should have been anticipated by the instructor or
licensed driver. 3 The licensed driver will not be excused from
the assumption of the risk merely because the inexperienced driver
has taken a course in driver's training and is about to take the state
driver's test. Until he has passed the test, the inexperienced driver
is presumed under law to be incompetent.2 4 One common element in
all the cases holding that the licensed, experienced driver assumed
the risk as a matter of law is that the court concludes the accident
was caused by the novice driver's inexperience. Thus the main
contrast between the matter of law holdings and the jury question

holdings is that the matter of law decisions do not think it necessary
to consider factors other than inexperience in determining the legal
relationship between the parties.
West Virginia cases which discuss the assumption of risk doctrine
do so primarily in comparing it with contributory negligence. The
discussions show, however, that the West Virginia court defines
assumption of risk to include the same elements that other courts
find necessary for the application of the doctrine.2 The West
Virginia court in Spurlin v. Nardo26 held that knowledge is a neces21 In an analogous situation it has been held that, like the issue of assumption of risk, the issue of contributory negligence cannot be decided as a
matter of law but is a jury question. Van Sciver v. Abbott's Alderney Dairies,

950 N.J. Misc. 949, 951, 143 A. 153 (1928).
22 St. Denis v. Skidmore, 221 N.Y.2d 613, 614 (App. Div. 1961), aff'd
237 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 188 N.E.2d 268 (1963); Spellman v. Spellnan, 309 N.Y.
663, 664, 128 N.E.2d 317, 318 (1955); Le Fleur v. Vergilia, 117 N.Y.S.2d
244, 245 (App. Div. 1952); Thomas v. Steppert, 200 Wis. 388, 393, 228
N.W. 513, 515 (1930).
23
24
25

Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Ky. 1959).

Aloisio v. Nelson, 209 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (Misc. 1961).
Spurlin v. Nardo, 145 W. Va. 408, 417-418, 114 S.E.2d 913, 919-920

(1960); Mathews v. Cumberland and Allegheny Gas Co., 138 W. Va. 639,

656-657, 77 S.E.2d 180, 190-191 (1953); Wright v. Valan, 130 W. Va. 466,
477-478, 43 S.E.2d 364, 371 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119
W. Va.
215, 217, 193 S.E. 57, 58 (1937).
26
145 W. Va. 408, 418, 114 S.E.2d 913, 920 (1960).
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sary element of assumption of risk doctrine. The court in that same
case indicated also that it is a question for jury determination
whether the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of facts on which to
base his choice of action.2 7 Thus it is reasonable to forecast that
the court will not permit the issue of assumption of risk to be decided
as a question or law if there is any conflict in the evidence as to
knowledge on the part of the injured instructor.
The West Virginia Code provides that one who holds an instruction permit must be accompanied by a licensed driver when he,
the permittee, is driving."8 Even the dissenting opinion in Chalmers
agrees that when there is evidence that the plaintiff accompanied
the driver only to satisfy a statutory requirement and not to
give instructions, assumption of risk will be a jury question. The
reason for this approach is that giving instructions clearly shows
a realization of defendant's inexperience while, when no instructions
are given the existence of such realization can be honestly disputed. 9
Under these particular circumstances the West Virginia court would
probably hold that assumption of risk is a jury question.
The courts are in general agreement that knowledge and appreciation of the risk and voluntary consent to encounter the risk are the
basic elements necessary to establish the defense of assumption of
risk. Some courts feel that in factual situations similar to Chalmers
several factors could have caused the accident and that these factors
must be weighed by the jury in determining whether the plaintiff
assumed the risk of the harm he incurred as a result of the accident.
Other courts feel that the only possible cause of the accident was the
defendant's inexperience and that the plaintiff assumed the risk,
as a matter of law, of the harm that resulted from this inexperience.
While the West Virginia court has spoken only generally on the issue
of assumption of risk, it would appear that the language in Spurlin
v. Nardo offers itself as a proper basis to forecast that the West
Virginia court will treat assumption of risk as a jury question in a
case in which a licensed driver who was injured while instructing an
unlicensed driver sues that unlicensed driver.
John Reed Homburg
27
28
29

Id. at 417, 114 S.E.2d at 919.
17B, art. 2, § 5 (Michie 1966).
Chalmers v. Willis, 231 A.2d 70, 77 (Md. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
W. VA. CODE ch.
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